Patch Package: OTP 20.1.7

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Patch Package: OTP 20.1.7

Ingela Anderton Andin-4

Patch Package:    OTP 20.1.7
Git Tag:                 OTP-20.1.7
Date:                    2017-11-22
Trouble Report Id:  OTP-14632, OTP-14653, OTP-14655, OTP-14748, OTP-14766
Seq num:
System:                  OTP
Release:                 20
Application:            public_key-1.5.1, ssl-8.2.2
Predecessor:          OTP 20.1.6

 Check out the git tag OTP-20.1.7, and build a full OTP system
 including documentation. Apply one or more applications from this
 build as patches to your installation using the 'otp_patch_apply'
 tool. For information on install requirements, see descriptions for
 each application version below.

 --- public_key-1.5.1 ------------------------------------------------

 The public_key-1.5.1 application can be applied independently of
 other applications on a full OTP 20 installation.

 --- Improvements and New Features ---

  OTP-14653    Application(s): public_key

               Hostname verification: Add handling of the general name
               iPAddress in certificate's subject alternative name
               extension (subjAltName).

  OTP-14766    Application(s): public_key

               Correct key handling in pkix_test_data/1 and use a
               generic example mail address instead of an existing

 Full runtime dependencies of public_key-1.5.1: asn1-3.0, crypto-3.8,
 erts-6.0, kernel-3.0, stdlib-2.0

 --- ssl-8.2.2 -------------------------------------------------------

 Note! The ssl-8.2.2 application can *not* be applied independently of
       other applications on an arbitrary OTP 20 installation.

       On a full OTP 20 installation, also the following runtime
       dependency has to be satisfied:
       -- public_key-1.5 (first satisfied in OTP 20.1)

 --- Fixed Bugs and Malfunctions ---

  OTP-14632    Application(s): ssl

               TLS sessions must be registered with SNI if provided,
               so that sessions where client hostname verification
               would fail can not connect reusing a session created
               when the server name verification succeeded.

               Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.

  OTP-14748    Application(s): ssl

               An erlang TLS server configured with cipher suites
               using rsa key exchange, may be vulnerable to an
               Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext attack (AKA Bleichenbacher
               attack) against RSA, which when exploited, may result
               in plaintext recovery of encrypted messages and/or a
               Man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attack, despite the attacker
               not having gained access to the server’s private key
               itself. CVE-2017-1000385

               Exploiting this vulnerability to perform plaintext
               recovery of encrypted messages will, in most practical
               cases, allow an attacker to read the plaintext only
               after the session has completed. Only TLS sessions
               established using RSA key exchange are vulnerable to
               this attack.

               Exploiting this vulnerability to conduct a MiTM attack
               requires the attacker to complete the initial attack,
               which may require thousands of server requests, during
               the handshake phase of the targeted session within the
               window of the configured handshake timeout. This attack
               may be conducted against any TLS session using RSA
               signatures, but only if cipher suites using RSA key
               exchange are also enabled on the server. The limited
               window of opportunity, limitations in bandwidth, and
               latency make this attack significantly more difficult
               to execute.

               RSA key exchange is enabled by default although least
               prioritized if server order is honored. For such a
               cipher suite to be chosen it must also be supported by
               the client and probably the only shared cipher suite.

               Captured TLS sessions encrypted with ephemeral cipher
               suites (DHE or ECDHE) are not at risk for subsequent
               decryption due to this vulnerability.

               As a workaround if default cipher suite configuration
               was used you can configure the server to not use
               vulnerable suites with the ciphers option like this:

               {ciphers, [Suite || Suite <- ssl:cipher_suites(),
               element(1,Suite) =/= rsa]}

               that is your code will look somethingh like this:

               ssl:listen(Port, [{ciphers, [Suite || Suite <-
               ssl:cipher_suites(), element(1,S) =/= rsa]} |

               Thanks to Hanno Böck, Juraj Somorovsky and Craig Young
               for reporting this vulnerability.

 --- Improvements and New Features ---

  OTP-14655    Application(s): ssl

               If no SNI is available and the hostname is an
               IP-address also check for IP-address match. This check
               is not as good as a DNS hostname check and certificates
               using IP-address are not recommended.

               Thanks to Graham Christensen for reporting this.

 Full runtime dependencies of ssl-8.2.2: crypto-3.3, erts-7.0,
 inets-5.10.7, kernel-3.0, public_key-1.5, stdlib-3.2


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